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DIZER ‘NÃO HÁ MAIS NADA A PERDER’ ”: A BATALHA
INACABADA PARA A REGULAÇÃO LABORAL DA “GIG
ECONOMY” NO ESTADO DA CALIFÓRNIA
Francis J. Mootz III2
Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento,
California EUA
Jeffrey Michael
Professor of Public Policy, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific,
Sacramento, California EUA
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PEARL. Intérprete: Janis Joplin. Los Angeles: Columbia Records, 1971. LP, faixa 7.
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SUMMARY: Introduction. 1. The Growth of the
Gig Economy in California: Economic and Normative
Considerations. 2. Regulating the Gig Economy in
California under Competing Definitions of “Employee”.
2-A. A. The Common Law Multi-factor Control Test.
2-B. The California Supreme Court Adopts the “ABC
Test” for Wage Order Claims. 2-C. The California
Legislature Selectively Extends the ABC Test:
AB 5 and AB2257. 2-D. The Empire Strikes Back:
Proposition 22 and App-Based Drivers. 3. Thoughts
on Ending the Regulatory Chaos Surrounding the
Gig Economy. 4. Conclusion.
SUMÁRIO: Introdução. 1. O Crescimento da “Gig
Economy”3 (Setor de Serviços por Aplicativo) na
Califórnia: Considerações Econômicas e Jurídicas.
2. Regulando o Trabalho na “Gig Economy” na
Califórnia a partir das Definições Concorrentes de
“Empregado” no Direito Norte-Americano. 2-A.
O Teste Multi-Fatorial do Sistema da “Common
Law” para Aferir a Subordinação Trabalhista. 2-B.

3

NdT: Optamos por manter a expressão original “gig economy” não só por sua difusão nos ambientes
especializados, mesmo em publicações nacionais, como por sua maior precisão para discussão em nível técnico
e acadêmico. Seu significado, no Brasil, vem sendo comumente identificado com o termo “uberização” do
trabalho, por simplificação e adoção por prevalência daquela que é talvez a mais característica (embora não a
única) das plataformas digitais a que diz respeito o fenômeno. O tema é inserido mais amplamente, no Direito
do Trabalho, dentro do estudo da precarização e informalidade laborais e está diretamente ligado às relações
de trabalho que decorrem dos serviços oferecidos por aplicativos. Segundo Nogueira e Carvalho (2021, p.
59-61), a “gig economy” ou uberização “[r]eúne o conjunto das atividades cuja ‘alocação’ do trabalhador se
dá por intermédio de um aplicativo, seja para telefone celular, seja para computadores – ou, para resgatarmos
um elemento utilizado quando descrevemos a terceirização, pela presença de uma empresa operadora de
aplicativo que opera como interposto. Esta é, efetivamente, uma modalidade recente de contratação, surgida
principalmente a partir da difusão dos aplicativos para smartphones. Trata-se daquilo que Oitaven, Carelli
e Casagrande (2018) chamam de ‘economia do bico’. Essa expressão talvez não seja a mais apropriada para
descrever esta situação, pois, se por um lado a palavra bico carrega consigo a ideia de precariedade das
relações existentes, por outro pode sugerir que se trata de uma ocupação eventual ou secundária, quando
muitas vezes, senão na maioria delas, é de fato a ocupação principal do trabalhador”. Segundo os mesmos
autores e na mesma passagem, são três as modalidades de relações de trabalho que se enquadram nessa
categoria: (i) serviços específicos “on-demand” (p. ex., uber, 99); (ii) entregas “on-demand” (Ifood, Rappi,
p. ex.) e; (ii) plataformas de mera intermediação de serviços entre um cliente final e, diretamente com este,
um prestador profissional, as quais cumprem papel semelhante ao dos antigos classificados de jornais (p.
ex., a plataforma Getninjas).
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A Suprema Corte Estadual da Califórnia Adota o
“Teste ABC” para Ações Envolvendo Salários e
Jornada. 2-C. O Poder Legislativo do Estado da
Califórnia Amplia a Aplicação do “Teste ABC”: O
Projeto de Lei AB-5 e AB-2257. 2-D. O Império
Contra-Ataca: Proposição 22 e os Motoristas de
Aplicativo. 3. Reflexões sobre como Encerrar o Caos
Normativo na Regulação das Relações Laborais na
“Gig Economy”. 4. Conclusão.4
ABSTRACT: In this article, a law professor and economist from the United
States assess the recent efforts in California to address the gig economy
and the designation of workers as either “employees” or “independent
contractors.” They offer their suggestions for productive ways forward
in this effort.
RESUMO: Neste artigo escrito em coautoria, dois professores de uma
faculdade de Direito norte-americana, um deles jurista e o outro economista
que é professor de Políticas Públicas, avaliam os recentes esforços adotados
pelo estado da Califórnia5 visando regular a “gig economy” (o setor de
serviços por aplicativos ou plataformas digitais) no que diz respeito
especificamente ao tema da qualificação de seus trabalhadores como
“empregados” ou “trabalhadores autônomos”. Ao final do artigo, os autores
oferecem sugestões para possíveis caminhos produtivos a seguir neste
esforço.
4

5

NdT: Ao texto original, escrito em Inglês, foram acrescidos o sumário e as palavras-chave em Inglês (para
atendimento das exigências de publicação, mesma razão aliás que levou à necessidade de adaptar todas
as citações e referências, uma a uma) e foi ele livremente traduzido apenas no título, sumário, resumo e
palavras-chave, além do acréscimo de algumas poucas notas explicativas (NdT), por Daniel Pulino – que
é Procurador Federal, Professor da Faculdade de Direito da PUC/SP, mestre e doutor pela PUC/SP, e
participante, entre meados de 2019 e 2020, do programa de “Visiting Scholar” da Faculdade de Direito
da Universidade da Califórnia, campus Davis, pela Escola da AGU, período em que o Professor Francis J.
Mootz lecionou em referida Universidade. A ele em particular (e agora a Jeffrey Michael) registre-se um
grande agradecimento, pelo atendimento ao convite com a produção de tão atual e inédito artigo. E pela
oportunidade, aproveitamos para também agradecer, sincera e profundamente, à Escola da AGU, assim como,
mais amplamente, à AGU, à PGF e à Procuradoria Federal junto à Previc, pela inestimável oportunidade
de estudo, sem a qual aquele encontro e o presente artigo não teriam ocorrido.
NdT: Em contraposição à velocidade com a qual passamos a assistir, no mundo todo, à expansão dos serviços
por aplicativo ou plataformas digitais na última década (e com acelerada intensidade, particularmente, a
partir das transformações impostas pela pandemia da Covid-19), a regulação legal das relações laborais
inerentes a esse novo e cada vez mais presente setor da economia tem sido marcada pela lentidão na busca
e sobretudo na descoberta de soluções capazes de responder adequadamente aos reais problemas surgidos
quanto à precarização e falta de suficiente proteção aos trabalhadores, diante da redução de custos e liberdade
de vinculação laborativa que são características do próprio modo de funcionamento do modelo de negócio.
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KEYWORDS: Freedom to work. Worker protection. Gig Economy.
Employee. Independent Contractor. Dynamex Case. California Assembly
Bill 5 (“AB5”). Proposition 22.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Liberdade de Trabalho. Legislação Trabalhista.
Setor de Serviços por Aplicativo. Empregados. Trabalhadores Autônomos.
Caso “Dynamex” (da Suprema Corte do Estado da California). Projeto de
Lei Estadual AB 5. Proposição 22.

Vivemos possivelmente ainda uma fase que, se não é de completa desregulação dessas relações de trabalho
(comparável talvez à primeira etapa da Revolução Industrial no século XVIII), é ao menos, seguramente,
de enorme dificuldade para enquadrar o novo fenômeno nas categorias jurídicas tradicionalmente postas
no âmbito legal e jurisprudencial do Direito do Trabalho para enfrentar os desafios surgidos. E justamente
visando responder a tais desafios, a recentíssima experiência vivida no estado norte-americano da Califórnia
(não por acaso, local de origem e sede de alguma das gigantes companhias do setor, como é o caso de Uber,
Lyft, Doordash, para ficar em poucos exemplos), com suas reviravoltas que bem se acham descritas neste
trabalho, talvez seja uma das mais ricas e significativas em todo o mundo e, justamente por isso, pode
acabar servindo de modelo de análise e ensaio para muitos outros países, como aqui mesmo no Brasil. Vem
daí então, não obstante as acentuadas e inegáveis diferenças legais entre os sistemas jurídicos brasileiro e
norte-americano, a atualidade e o interesse do presente artigo, que nos é apresentado por dois qualificados
estudiosos nativos que acompanharam e ainda acompanham de perto a experiência californiana e que podem,
assim, nos oferecer sua abalizada visão do momento em que hoje se situam as principais discussões desse
assunto, que é, literalmente, da ordem do dia em praticamente todo os países do mundo.
Dentro do federalismo norte-americano, a constituição estadual da Califórnia (como a de vários outros estados)
prevê instrumentos de democracia direta (como também há entre nós, na Constituição Federal, o plebiscito,
o referendo e a iniciativa popular de leis) chamados de “ballot propositions”, que podem ser de vários tipos
e finalidades, como emendar leis ou a constituição estaduais, criar novas leis, rejeitar leis existentes etc. A
“Proposition 22” resultou formalmente de iniciativa popular mediante coleta de assinaturas, após campanha
fortemente financiada justamente pelas maiores companhias do setor de serviços por aplicativo (foram mais
de 205 milhões de dólares vertidos por Uber, Lyft, Doordash, Instacart e Postmates, contra aproximados
20 milhões de dólares apenas reunidos pelos sindicatos que fizeram campanha pela rejeição da proposição),
resultando na sua aprovação na última eleição geral de 3 de novembro de 2020 (as “propositions” estaduais
na California podem ser votadas juntamente com a eleição geral, e foi este o caso), a mesma que elegeu o
atual presidente Joe Biden. A medida acabou sendo aprovada pelos eleitores por cerca de 59% dos votos.
Com a vitória, as companhias passaram a poder classificar seus motoristas como trabalhadores autônomos
(“independente contractors”), não como empregados (“employees”), o que as isentou da observância das
condições legais de proteção a estes, desde que fossem concedidas algumas condições mínimas de trabalho,
inferiores, naturalmente, às dos empregados.
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INTRODUCTION

Labor economies around the world are being disrupted by a
disaggregated mode of production that is organized through numerous
short-term contracts rather than stable employment relationships.6 This
emerging model includes the “platform economy,” in which a company
creates an app to connect those seeking services with workers providing
them. The most common example are platforms that connect people
with a driver who will transport them somewhere (e.g., DoorDash). The
relationship between the worker and the person paying for the service is
fleeting and potentially a singular event. Just as a band will arrange to
play a “gig” at a bar for a few hours without becoming employees of the
bar, an Uber driver will accept connections through the Uber app for
discrete driving “gigs” without becoming an employee of the riders or of
the Uber platform. Many applaud this new reality; many others decry
it. But one thing is certain: the “gig economy” is here, and the only real
question is how best to foster and regulate this new reality.7
In this short article, we will describe how California has addressed
the gig economy. Over the past few years, California has acted far more
aggressively than most States in the United States, through a combination
of court decisions, legislation and a Proposition enacted directly by the
people. The California experience has been complex and somewhat
convoluted, but the guiding principle is clear. This is the next great
moment in the centuries-old contest between management and labor,
fought under the competing rhetorical ideals of “freedom of contract”
and “worker protection.”
This article is organized in three parts. First, we describe the
advent of the gig economy in California and note its rapid expansion.
Second, we describe the growth of regulatory structures that govern the
gig economy, explaining the transition from the common law definition of
employee, to a revision of the definition by the California Supreme Court,
to expansive legislation by the California Legislature, and finally to the
enactment of Proposition 22 directly by the people in last November’s
election. Third, we offer our suggestions for how this chaotic regulatory
6

Nationwide, the United States has experienced a shift from relatively high earning independent contractors
who garner large wages (such as lawyers and business consultants) to a fast-growing segment of the economy
in which independent contractors are low paid. See Katherine Lim, et al. (2019).

7

Two professors (CHERRY; RUTSCHMAN, 2020, p. 11-16) recently argued that the “essential” status of
gig workers during the Covid-19 pandemic may be a step toward eliminating the precarious nature of gig
work that is premised on regarding it as a short-term source of supplemental income.
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story might better serve the needs of workers and their customers. We
write together as a Professor of Law and as a Professor of Public Policy
with a focus on economics, because this issue calls for an interdisciplinary
approach to understand and react to the rapidly changing legal, economic,
political and social contexts.
1. THE GROWTH OF THE GIG ECONOMY IN CALIFORNIA: ECONOMIC
AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS.

The number of self-employed workers in California grew steadily
over a recent five-year period, apparently driven largely by the explosion
of those participating in the platform economy. The census data on
“nonemployer” individual proprietors shows growth from 2.607 million
workers in 2012 to 3.066 million workers in 2018 (an increase of 18% in six
years). Transportation accounted for the majority of that growth, moving
from 121,527 workers in 2012 to 393,340 workers in 2018 (an increase of
224% in six years). While this growth is remarkable, it is certainly an
underestimate due to nonreporting on taxes and because nonemployer
statistics do not include those with reported business earnings under
$1,000.8 The transformation has accelerated over the past several years.
This data concerns all independent contractors, not just those
engaged in the platform models of the gig economy. Given current
data collection by tax authorities, it is difficult to focus directly on the
growth of gig workers (such as a driver for Uber) as opposed to more
traditional subcontractors who are self-employed (such as a plumber who
markets himself to potential customers).9 Nevertheless, a recent study
by an economist from UCLA (FELER, 2020, p. 3) provides stunning
8

Compare:
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=nonemployer&g=0400000US06&tid=NONEMP2018.NS1800N
ONEMP&hidePreview=false.
with:
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=nonemployer&g=0400000US06&tid=NONEMP2012.
NS1200NONEMP&hidePreview=false.
The data is difficult to analyze accurately, as acknowledged by Katz and Krueger (2019, p. 3). The authors
walk back their 2015 estimate of the enormous growth of “alternative work arrangements” and describe
the “difficulty capturing changes in the incidence of casual or intermittent work in the United States” due
to a variety of factors.

9

In 2017 the U.C. Berkeley Center for Labor and Research and Education published a white paper that
describes the difficulties in quantifying the growth of the gig economy as distinguished from traditional
independent contractors. See Annette Bernhardt and Sarah Thompson (2017). The authors suggest that
the appropriate inquiry is whether the work performed is the worker’s primary job or for supplemental
income, and whether the job is a “quality job”.
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confirmation of the rapid expansion of the number of workers participating
in the platform economy through rideshare apps such as Uber or Lyft.
The study concludes that the apps “expanded the market for ‘taxi and
limousine services’ in California by 171,000 drivers and $3.3 billion” in
revenues from 2010 to 2018 (FELER, 2020, p. 3). This growth was in
addition to the forecasted steady growth of these services that would
have occurred in the absence of the gig economy. Because the majority
of drivers use the platforms as a source of supplemental income and to
bridge financial challenges, it is critical that these workers have low
barriers to entry and flexibility in scheduling (FELER, 2020, p. 5). The
study suggests that “by helping workers smooth economic shocks and
earn additional income, the gig economy reduces the government’s role
in caring for these workers.” (FELER, 2020, p. 5).
Of course, this observation elides important normative considerations.
The foremost question is whether drivers should have to submit to the
limitations of the gig economy to survive economic challenges that could
be addressed by a more robust social safety net. Another way of reading
the data is that drivers require and celebrate flexibility in schedules because
they are forced to cobble together several jobs in order to earn a living
wage. Or that the newly unemployed often turn to ride-share services
because unemployment benefits, up until the COVID-19 pandemic, have
been too small to cover basic needs. Consider the author’s conclusion
about the growth of this sector of the economy:
Even before the current recession, when California’s economy was
running at 3.9 percent unemployment, its lowest level in decades, the
number of people signing up to work for Uber and Lyft as independent
contractors kept increasing. This is a revealing fact. It means that
even when there are lots of other jobs available, people still want to
drive for Uber and Lyft. [Treating these workers as employees]
would ration these opportunities to those who are able to work fulltime and would reduce options for people seeking part-time work and
supplemental income. (FELER, 2020, p. 7-8).

It is not at all clear that the attraction of rideshare apps to workers
seeking supplemental income proves that the gig economy is beneficial to
workers in general.10 Even if converting all drivers to employees would
sharply reduce the number of part-time, supplemental jobs, it would likely
10 We put to the side for now the question of the benefits to consumers and the impact on the economy as
a whole. The growth in the number of drivers is a direct result of the strong consumer response to the
convenience and affordability of these new services.
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lead to substantial improvements for full-time workers most dependent on
this income. It is reasonable to ask if the focus of regulation of labor policy
should be to improve the inadequacies of the employment opportunities that
motivate employed workers to supplement their income in the “flexible”
gig economy in the first place.
On the other hand, there clearly are a significant number of workers
who genuinely took advantage of the flexibility offered by the gig economy.
Examples come to mind easily, and are confirmed anecdotally by our
conversations with drivers over the years: retirees who want to earn
a little extra income at their convenience while enjoying some social
interactions; graduate students earning some extra cash in between their
classes and teaching obligations; and primary caregivers who are able to
drive for a few hours while their children are in school to help supplement
their income. These persons are not turning to the gig economy out of
desperation, but are more freely choosing a convenient and flexible source
of additional income. Assuming that the majority of workers fall back on
the gig economy to buffer periodic financial distress might explain why
many workers “typically use platforms in short bursts and for limited
amounts of time: more than half (52%) of labor platform participants exit
within 12 months (40% within the first 6 months) – (BERNHARDT;
THOMPSON, 2017, p. 16). But it might equally be the case that the
drivers abandon the option because the platform provides insufficient pay
and benefits to make it worth the effort. Consequently, there are many
“truths” to consider when seeking to regulate a sector of the economy
that is not yet fully understood.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting U.S. policy response has
added new dimensions. The pandemic caused both consumer demand and
driver supply for rideshare apps to plunge due to safety concerns, while
demand for gig-workers by food and grocery delivery apps surged. In
addition, the U.S. government has temporarily added a large supplement
to unemployment benefits and extended unemployment benefits to
independent contractors, including rideshare drivers, that were previously
exempt. In Spring 2021, consumer demand for travel has started to recover
as COVID-19 vaccinations increase, and the rideshare companies have
suddenly found themselves with an extreme shortage of drivers that has
left them frequently unable to satisfy their customers’ requests for rides
(FORMAN, 2021).
The shortage of drivers has temporarily led to higher fares and
higher earnings for drivers. Uber and Lyft were reporting hourly driver
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earnings were 25% to 75% higher than pre-pandemic earnings in April
2021 (BELLON, 2021).
Historically, newly unemployed workers have been the largest
source of new rideshare drivers, but for much of the pandemic, these
unemployed workers have received a federal supplemental payment in
addition to regular unemployment benefits from their state. Between
March and September 2021, the federal supplement to unemployment
benefits is an additional $300 per week. These enhanced safety-net benefits
make it harder for rideshare companies to attract new drivers from the
ranks of the unemployed. The $300 weekly unemployment supplement
is scheduled to expire in September 2021, and could provide a natural
experiment to determine the relationship between a weak social safety
net and rideshare driver supply.
2. REGULATING THE GIG ECONOMY IN CALIFORNIA UNDER COMPETING
DEFINITIONS OF “EMPLOYEE.”

Under both federal and state law, many protections and social
benefits for workers are limited to “employees.” As a result, the worker’s
status as an employee is prerequisite for invoking protections under
statutes that seek to limit the economic power of the employer. For
example, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires certain employers to
pay their employees a minimum wage per hour, and to pay an overtime
premium for more than forty hours in a week. But if a homeowner hires
an electrician to install new lighting fixtures, the homeowner is almost
certainly dealing with an independent contractor and need not ensure
that the contractor or its employees earn minimum wage and overtime.
Only an employee can avail herself of the protections of employment law
and secure the benefits of employment law.
The platform economy is built on the categorization of the workers
as independent contractors who are connected through the app with people
seeking their services. The business model is premised on avoiding the
costs and complexity of having continuing employees. In Part A we explain
that complex questions for platform workers arise under the traditional
common law definition of “employee.” In Part B we describe how this
uncertainty was dramatically resolved for purposes of California wage
orders under a new definition of “employee” adopted by the Supreme
Court of California in the Dynamex case. In Part C we describe how the
California legislature expanded the new Dynamex definition to apply to
questions beyond the regulation of hours and wages. Finally in Part D
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we describe the adoption of Proposition 22 by the people in a direct vote,
overriding the legislative definition of rideshare workers as putative
employees.
A. The Common Law Multi-factor Control Test.

Federal and state courts generally have adopted the common law
test of “agency” to determine if a worker is an “employee” for purposes of
employment law protection. The United States Supreme Court emphasized
that the question of the degree of “control” exercised by the hiring entity
was central to the determination, but noted the additional considerations:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location
of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long
to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party
(UNITED STATES, 1992).
As with all multi-factor tests, the court must engage in a detailed
inquiry to determine how the test applies to particular cases. We now
turn to a typical case applying the multi-factor control test.
In Perez v. SuperMaid LLC (UNITED STATES, 2014), the court
determined that maids hired by a cleaning business were employees because
the business exercised extensive control over their work. The maids were
provided with vehicles, uniforms, cleaning supplies and tools. They were
trained how to clean houses, and their performance was monitored. Their
work was scheduled by the home office, and the maids did not manage
their own workflow; indeed, they were monitored by GPS and told to
hurry up if they were falling behind the established schedule. The maids
could not increase their income by performing faster or more efficiently
because their schedules were set the day before, in many cases the jobs
assigned took longer than allotted, and maids faced pay deductions if
rushed work resulted in complaints by clients. Maids were not allowed
to hire others to do their work or to assist them. Maids were not paid
for time spent traveling to pick up the workers, driving to each jobsite,
and returning the workers. Maids testified that it generally took about
one hour to travel between jobs, though it could take as little as thirty
minutes or as much as two hours. SuperMaid also did not provide maids
with paid breaks or meal periods. Maids were required to eat meals in the
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vehicle between jobs or when they get home, and they were not entitled
to take lunch breaks during the day. One the basis of all these facts, the
court concluded that the hiring entity retained extensive control over the
work and that the maids should be considered “employees” rather than
independent contractors.
The common law multi-factor test that centers on control has been
applied differently for claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, given the broader definition of “employee” under that statue. Instead
of focusing on “control” over the workers, the courts have looked to
the “economic realities” of the relationship to determine if the workers
have the “opportunity to earn a profit or a loss.” A leading example is
Secretary v. Lauritzen (UNITED STATES, 1987), a case considering the
status of migrant farmworkers who harvested pickles (cucumbers) from
the defendant’s field. The court articulated the “economic realities” test
as follows:
In seeking to determine the economic reality of the nature of the
working relationship, courts do not look to a particular isolated factor
but to all the circumstances of the work activity…. Certain criteria
have been developed to assist in determining the true nature of the
relationship, but no criterion is by itself, or by its absence, dispositive
or controlling.
Among the criteria courts have considered are the following six:
1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control as to
the manner in which the work is to be performed;
2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending
upon his managerial skill;
3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials
required for his task, or his employment of workers;
4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working
relationship;
6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part
of the alleged employer’s business. (UNITED STATES, 1987,
p. 1534-35)
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Although the migrant families had “negotiated” to harvest a
particular plot on the property, the court found that, as a matter of economic
reality, they lacked any genuine opportunity to profit or to risk losing
investment in a business. Consequently, the court concluded: “We cannot
say that the migrants are not employees, but, instead, are in business for
themselves and sufficiently independent to lie beyond the reach of the
FLSA. They depend on the defendants’ land, crops, agricultural expertise,
equipment, and marketing skills. They are the defendants’ employees”
(UNITED STATES, 1987, p. 1538).
Against this legal backdrop, businesses that developed platforms
as part of the gig economy have structured the relationship with the
worker and customer in an attempt to ensure that the workers are not
their employees. Consider the meal delivery platform, Grubhub, which
matches customers seeking delivery of food with drivers willing to make
that delivery. Grubhub seeks to relinquish almost all control over the
work to be done, ensuring that the driver is in charge of whether she
makes a profit or suffers a loss. As a result, Grubhub does not need to
comply with employment law protections of its drivers. In a recent case,
a California court explained in detail why Grubhub did not control the
manner and means of the work:
Grubhub exercised little control over the details of Mr. Lawson’s work
during the four months he performed delivery services for Grubhub.
Grubhub did not control how he made the deliveries-whether by car,
motorcycle, scooter or bicycle. Nor did it control the condition of the
mode of transportation Mr. Lawson chose. Grubhub never inspected or
even saw a photograph of Mr. Lawson’s vehicle…. Grubhub also did not
control Mr. Lawson’s appearance while he was making Grubhub deliveries.
…
Grubhub did not require Mr. Lawson to undergo any particular
training or orientation. He was not provided with a script for how
to interact with restaurants or customers…. No Grubhub employee
ever performed a ride along with Mr. Lawson; indeed, no Grubhub
employee ever met Mr. Lawson in person before this lawsuit.
…
Grubhub had no control over whom, if anyone, Mr. Lawson wanted
to accompany him on his deliveries.
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…
Mr. Lawson, rather than Grubhub, controlled whether and when
Mr. Lawson worked, and for how long…. Grubhub did not require
Mr. Lawson to work a minimum number of blocks nor was there a
maximum number of blocks; Mr. Lawson was not required to sign
up for any particular number of blocks, or any blocks at all. If Mr.
Lawson did not want to perform any deliveries for a particular week or
month because he was busy with his acting career or simply preferred
to do something else, Grubhub did not require him to sign up for any
blocks. In sum, Grubhub had no control over what blocks, if any, Mr.
Lawson chose to work. Mr. Lawson could decide not to work a block
he signed up for right up to the time the block started.
…
Thus, at bottom, Mr. Lawson had complete control of his work schedule:
Grubhub could not make him work and could not count on him to work.
Even when he signed up for a block, he could cancel his engagement
right up to the block start.
…
Grubhub also did not control how and when Mr. Lawson delivered
the restaurant orders he chose to accept.
…
No one at Grubhub was Mr. Lawson’s boss or supervisor (UNITED
STATES, 2018a).

This selective excerpt of the extensive factual analysis in the case
provides a sense of how workers in the gig economy would be regarded
under the traditional multi-factor control test. If carefully structured by
the platform’s lawyers, the platform can avoid the legal entanglements of
having employees.
The costs and benefits of the platform approach are apparent.
On one hand, when platforms consciously structure the relationship
with workers to relinquish control, they are providing an important
option to workers who seek highly flexible opportunities with minimal
entry barriers. For example, if Mr. Lawson needed to attend to a sick
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pet on a particular day, he is free to cancel his driving block with
Grubhub at his option. He literally has no “boss or supervisor.” On
the other hand, the lack of an employment relationship gives rise to
potential abuse. Mr. Lawson sought recognition as an “employee”
in order to secure certain employment benefits, including minimum
wage, overtime and employee expense reimbursement laws. He
would argue that any freedom that he had was purchased at the cost
of substandard wages.
The Grubhub case pointed toward the legal battles on the horizon
to determine if gig workers enjoy the flexibility and opportunity for
profit and loss associate with independent contractor status, or whether
gig workers enjoy the protections of employment laws that assist them to
address the superior bargaining power of the platform. Some argued that
the test for employee status should be revised. Others argued that a new
status was required to address the unique features of the gig economy.
For example, two leading commentators argue for a new category of
“independent worker” to address the needs of gig workers (HARRIS;
KRUEGER, 2015). Against this backdrop, in 2018 the California Supreme
Court changed the definition of “employee” under the state version of the
Fair Labor Standards Act governing minimum wage, overtime wages and
other benefits. We now turn to that development.
B. The California Supreme Court Adopts the “ABC Test” for Wage Order
Claims.

In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (UNITED
STATES, 2018b), the California Supreme Court determined that the
broadly worded language governing wage claims called for a more liberal
test of employee than the multi-factor control test, even when the multifactor test was attuned to the “economic realities” of the relationship. The
case involved “independent drivers” hired by Dynamex to deliver parcels
for Dynamex’s customers. The Court begins by succinctly describing
the various interests at stake:
Under both California and federal law, the question whether an
individual worker should properly be classified as an employee or,
instead, as an independent contractor has considerable significance
for workers, businesses, and the public generally. On the one hand,
if a worker should properly be classified as an employee, the hiring
business bears the responsibility of paying federal Social Security and
payroll taxes, unemployment insurance taxes and state employment
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taxes, providing a worker’s compensation insurance, and most relevant
for the present case, complying with numerous state and federal
statutes and regulations governing the wages, hours and working
conditions of employees. The worker then obtains the protection
of the applicable labor laws and regulations. On the other hand, if
a worker should properly be classified as an independent contractor,
the business does not bear any of those costs or responsibilities, the
worker obtains none of the numerous labor law benefits, and the public
may be required under applicable laws to assume additional financial
burdens with respect to such workers and their families (UNITED
STATES, 2018b, p. 912-913).

The Court determined that it could balance these interests with
regard to wage and hour claims only by adopting a new definition of
“employee” under the “ABC Test.” The ABC test originated in some
states under their unemployment compensation statutes, but had also
been used more generally to define employees. The California Supreme
Court determined that the ABC test was appropriate for all wage and
hour claims, but did not apply to test beyond that context.
The ABC test begins by presuming that a worker is an employee.
The hiring entity can overcome this presumption and establish that the
worker is an independent contractor only by proving three things, hence
the “ABC” name. The court phrased the three-prong test as:
The ABC test presumptively considers all workers to be employees,
and permits workers to be classified as independent contractors only if
the hiring business demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies
each of three conditions: (a) that the worker is free from the control
and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the
work, both under the contract for the performance or the work and
in fact; and (b) that the worker performs work that is outside the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (c) that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed
(UNITED STATES, 2018b, p. 955-56).

Element “b” has been the most challenging factor for ride-share
businesses.
In an effort to satisfy element “a” and reduce control, Uber announced
that California drivers could set their own fares in July 2020 (UBER Blog,
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2020). However, Uber revoked that control option for California drivers
in April 2021 citing high numbers of customer cancellations due to higher
driver-set prices (SAID, 2021). Of course, this change also came after
California voters approved Proposition 22 in November 2020 which as
discussed in more detail in Part D, relieves rideshare companies from
satisfying the ABC test.
Element “b” requires the business to show that the worker is
performing work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s
business. Consider a platform company such as Uber. What is Uber’s
“usual course of business?” If the business is to provide rides to customers,
then of course the drivers would be considered employees because they
are supplying the core services provided in the course of Uber’s business.
This conclusion is difficult to overcome, as the cases following Dynamex
have made clear. In Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc. (UNITED
STATES, 2022), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Dynamex was to
be applied retroactively to a case involving the sale of cleaning services
“franchises” to persons who performed the work. The course acknowledged
that element “b” is the element that is most susceptible to a summary
judgment, given that there will often be no dispute as to material facts
when the question is simply to determine the ordinary course of the hiring
entity’s business (UNITED STATES, 2022, p. 15).
The court explained that element “b” has been applied by courts
according to several criteria. Courts “have considered whether the work
of the [workers] is necessary to or merely incidental to that of the hiring
entity, whether the work of the [worker] is continuously performed for
the hiring entity, and what business the hiring entity proclaims to be
in (UNITED STATES, 2022, p. 16). Although the court remanded to
the trial court to assess the facts under the ABC test, it noted that the
defendant faced difficulty in proving this element. The defendant’s sole
business was to recover payments from its “franchisees” who provided the
cleaning services consistently, unlike a plumbing contractor who might
be called occasionally to provide services incidental to the defendant’s
primary business (UNITED STATES, 2022, p. 17). The defendants
argument that it was solely a franchisor has not been will-received by
other courts, and the court concluded that the franchise arrangement was
simply a mode of distributing a service to customers, and not a distinct
business (UNITED STATES, 2022, p. 17).
The California Court of Appeal embraced this same approach with
regard to litigation seeking a preliminary injunction against rideshare
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businesses that orders them to cease mis-characterizing their drivers as
independent contractors under the ABC test. The State has the burden of
showing, among other elements, that it has a likelihood of success on the
merits of the injunction in order to receive a preliminary injunction during
the pendency of the litigation. The trial court found that the rideshare
platforms provided travel services as the core of the business, and so the
State was likely to prevail on the merits. The Court of Appeal agreed
that the “facts amply support the conclusion that, whether or not drivers
purchase a [platform] service from defendants, they perform services
for them in the usual course of defendants business,” and upheld the trial
court determination (UNITED STATES, 2020a).
In the wake of the Dynamex decision, the die appeared to be cast
for hiring entities in the platform economy under the ABC test. Even if
they could relinquish control significantly to meet element “a,” and even
if their workers conducted an independent business by simultaneously
working for multiple entities (such as Uber, Lyft, and Grubhub) that
would plausibly meet the “c” element, the hiring entities had no reliable
argument for meeting element “b.” Platform entities such as Uber
argued that they are in the platform business rather than providing
services to riders, but the courts regarded this claim with skepticism
and did not endorse it. The imposition of the ABC test had seemingly
ended the dispute: rideshare companies where employers of their drivers
for the purpose of wage and hour claims. But after the extensive press
coverage of the Dynamex decision and its aftermath, the legislature was
primed to jump into the fray. The result of this intervention complicated
matters significantly.
C. The California Legislature Selectively Extends the ABC Test: AB 5
and AB2257.

California Assembly Bill 5 (“AB5”) was signed into law September 18,
2019 and became effective on January 1, 2020. The law codifies the adoption
of the ABC test in Dynamex and extends the scope of the test beyond wage
and hour claims to include eligibility for unemployment compensation and
general employee protections under the California Labor Code. Thus, the
ABC test now defines employee status for the entire range of employee
protections, except for particular occupations that were exempted by statute
and therefore continued to be judged under the multi-factor control test.
There were approximately 100 exempted occupations, which included
licensed insurance agents, registered securities broker-dealers, direct sales
salespersons, licensed barbers and cosmetologists, and other enumerated
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professionals. These exceptions are sometimes quite detailed. For example,
a licensed cosmetologist is exempt, but only if the worker:
(I) Sets their own rates, processes their own payments, and is paid directly
by clients.
(II) Sets their own hours of work and has sole discretion to decide the number
of clients and which clients for whom they will provide services.
(III) Has their own book of business and schedules their own appointments.
(IV) Maintains their own business license for the services offered to clients.
(V) If the individual is performing services at the location of the hiring entity,
then the individual issues a Form 1099 to the salon or business owner from
which they rent their business space...(UNITED STATES, 2019)

A cosmetologist who meets this strict test and is therefore exempted
from the application of the ABC test would almost certainly be classified
as an independent contractor under the multi-factor control test.
There was a storm of protest after AB5 was enacted. On one
hand, platform companies such as Uber and Lyft argued that the
expansion of the limited Dynamex holding to the whole range of
employee rights would cause severe stress on their business model and
eliminate the f lexibility and control the workers currently enjoyed.
On the other hand, workers argued that some occupations should have
been exempted from the ABC test altogether, given the nature of the
work performed. As just one example, publishers would not be able to
treat freelance writers, editors and photographers as employees without
facing a severe economic strain, and those workers would be worse
off than they would be working as independent contractors writing
for a number of outlets. Even with AB5 creating an exemption for
writers who published fewer than 35 content pieces a year for a single
outlet, The American Society of Journalists and Authors joined with
the National Press Photographers Association to seek legal relief from
AB5 for their members.
AB5 engendered confusion and consternation across a number of
occupations beyond the freelance writers. Even the quintessential “gig
worker” a musician delivering a single-engagement live performance,
was potentially swept up by the broad reach of AB5 (EASTER, 2020).
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The law was hurriedly written at the close of the legislative session, and
the myriad exemptions were not carefully considered and worked out in
a consistent manner. The legislature subsequently passed some quick
“fixes,” and ultimately undertook a comprehensive revision of AB5 that
was enacted less than a year later.
The California legislature enacted AB2257 on September 4, 2020
to subsequentially amend AB5. The new law took effect immediately.
Perhaps most prominently, AB2257 addressed the problems facing music
performers and freelance journalists that had been widely reported after
the passage of AB5. Moreover, B2257 added new exemptions for a variety
of occupations, such as licensed landscape architects, real estate appraisers
and home inspectors. However, these new provisions detailing exemptions
were often quite detailed. For example, the law exempts freelance writers
from the ABC test, but only if that person
works under a written contract that specifies that rate of pay, intellectual
property rights, and obligation to pay by a defined time, as long as
the individual providing the services is not directly replacing an
employee who performed the same work at the same volume for the
hiring entity; the individual does not primarily perform the work
at the hiring entity’s business location….and the individual is not
restricted from working for more than one hiring entity [UNITED
STATES, 2020c, Sec. 2278(b)(2)(J)].

Although the intent is clear - don’t permit publishers to offload
employees into a “contractor” role – the test will likely be difficult to apply
in the myriad workplace settings of the rapidly changing business models for
contemporary media. This level of precision in the statue will incite the hiring
entities for each occupation in the state to lobby for more fairly balanced rules.
One might expect that this would be the end of the story. The
Dynamex decision introduced the ABC test of employee status for wage and
hour claims, disrupting the emerging platform economy. The legislature
quickly stepped in and expanded the scope of the ABC test to most
employment law protections, but also exempted a number of business
models and occupations that appeared to be working well. Those exempted
hiring entities were still subject to the multi-factor control test. The
balance of labor and capital had been accomplished.
However, California has a very strong tradition of direct democracy,
whereby the citizens may directly enact laws in the form of Propositions
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that are placed on the ballot if enough voters sign their names requesting
that it be subject to vote. In 2020 the voters enacted Proposition 22, which
had the effect of exempting rideshare drivers from the scope of AB5, as
amended. As we describe in the next section, the Proposition significantly
re-calibrated the regulation of the gig economy.
D. The Empire Strikes Back: Proposition 22 and App-Based Drivers.

Drawing from the democratic mythology of citizen initiatives, some
might claim that the classification of rideshare workers as employees
so offended the populace that they spontaneously arose and sought to
change the law. The political reality, of course, is quite different. After
the Dynamex decision was endorsed and expanded by the legislature in
AB5, it was clear that rideshare platforms would find no relief by seeking
a legislative exemption. Consequently, Uber, Lyft and DoorDash led other
rideshare apps to qualify Proposition 22 for the ballot and to secure its
approval by the voters.
The formal name of Proposition 22 was the “Protect App-Based
Drivers and Services Act.” The proponents were smart enough to add
additional benefits for ride-share drivers to sweeten the pot, and so the
Proposition was much more than merely negating the effect of AB5 on
Gig workers. As the Proposition summarized:
This chapter is necessary to protect their freedom to work independently,
while also providing those workers new benefits and protections not
available under current law. These benefits and protections include a
healthcare subsidy […]; a new minimum earnings guarantee tied to one
hundred twenty percent (120%) of minimum wage without maximum;
compensation for vehicle expenses; occupational accident insurance
to cover on-the-job injuries; and protection against discrimination
and sexual harassment.11

The public relations campaign was straightforward: allow drivers
to have continued flexibility to work as contractors, but provide them
with some of the most important “employee” benefits that protect them
from exploitation. This campaign was well-funded by the platform
companies, who spent more than $205 million dollars into the effort to
enact Proposition 22. In contrast, the labor groups fighting the initiative
raised only $19 million in support. The total spending on Proposition 22
11

Proposition 22, Chapter 10.5, Sec.7449 (f).
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was by far the most money ever spent on an initiative in California.12 The
turnout for this election was uncommonly high, given that Donald Trump
was running for a second term as President of the United States. More
than 80% of the registered voters in California voted on Proposition 22,
lending democratic legitimacy to the result.13 And the result was definitive:
Proposition 22 was adopted by a vote of 58.6% to 41.4%.14
The implications of Proposition 22 are significant. First, it divides
workers into two pools: those who work for transportation and delivery
platforms are deemed independent contractors, but those who work in
other sectors of the gig economy remain subject to AB5 and are almost
certainly to be regarded as employees. The CEO of Thumbtack, a platform
company that matches homeowners with personal service workers such
as handypersons or tutors, concluded that “the success of Uber, Lyft,
and others in essentially writing their own labor law looks bad […] and
makes it harder for everyone to engage in good-faith conversations about
how to reconfigure regulations so they’re fairer to everyone, workers
included. ‘Proposition 22 takes us further from a fundamental solution and
a holistic approach, and sets a terrible precedent,’ he says” (MARSHALL,
2020). Second, the terms of Proposition 22 seek to prevent amendment
by the legislature, which would further inhibit any attempt to provide a
comprehensive solution to worker categorization.15 The fragmentation of
the law applicable to gig workers means that a reasonable and principled
solution will be ever more difficult to find.
3. THOUGHTS ON ENDING THE REGULATORY CHAOS SURROUNDING
THE GIG ECONOMY.
12 The campaign finance details can be found at https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_22,_
AppBased_Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative_(2020). Acesso em 12 jul. 2022.
13 2020 CALIFORNIA Proposition 22. In: WIKIPEDIA: the free encyclopedia. Disponível em: https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_California_Proposition_22. Acesso em 12 jul. 2022.
Voting results can be found at https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2020-general/sov/complete-sov.pdf
(UNITED STATES, 2020d), p. 66.
14 Voting results can be found at https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2020-general/sov/complete-sov.pdf
(UNITED STATES, 2020d), p. 66.
15 The Proposition was immediately attacked in court for intruding on the legislature’s plenary power to
provide workers’ compensation insurance for all workers and intruding on the Supreme Court’s power to
interpret the provisions of the law. See Castellanos v. California, “Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandate
and Request for Expedited Review,” (January 12, 2021). The Emergency Petition was denied by the Supreme
Court on February 3, 2021, and so the plaintiff filed the litigation in the Superior Court and the case will
proceed there. The Supreme Court case docket is at: https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/
mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2338840&doc_no=S266551&request_token=NiIwLSEmTkw8W1
AtSCI9SEtIUFg0UDxTJSM%2BUz9TICAgCg%3D%3D. Acesso em 12 jul. 2022.
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The principal lesson to be learned from California’s attempt to
regulate the gig economy is that legal reforms are often piecemeal, subject
to powerful interests, and incoherent from a broad policy and economic
perspective. We suggest some broad guidelines for a more thoughtful and
integrated approach. Some of these speak to aspects of the general U.S.
policy issues that are amplified by increasing “gig” employment, and others
are changes that are more directly target app-based “gig” employment.
First, the U.S. economy is characterized by a relatively weak social
safety net compared to other wealthy nations. For example, unemployment
benefits are much less generous and most health insurance is privately
provided, most commonly by employers due to tax incentives. At the same
time that general social insurance remains low, regulations on employers
have strengthened in some states like California. This creates a strong
incentive for workers to seek employment status. By decoupling major
worker protections from employment status, as was attempted with the
Affordable Care Act and health insurance, workers may be best served in
a non-employment role. A second area for potential improvement is to
expand and modernize the set of legal arrangements for organizing work
beyond the current classifications of employee or independent contractor.
For example, Harris and Krueger (2015) proposed an “independent worker”
category as an intermediate status that blends aspects of employee status
with aspects of independent contractor status. Under their proposal,
Independent workers would receive some protections and benefits
of employees, such as the right to organize and the requirement
that intermediaries contribute half of Social Security and Medicare
payroll taxes, but not others, such as time-and-a-half for overtime
hours. Most importantly, we think that reforms along the lines that
we propose would help to protect and extend the hard-earned social
compact that has protected workers and improved living standards
over the past century, reduce uncertainty, and enhance the efficient
operation of the labor market.

We believe that it is critically important that any such new
classifications are created by the government with the broad public
interest in mind, rather than created by select, powerful industries to
serve their own purposes as app-based transportation companies did
with Proposition 22.
Another option to consider is for governments to become more
actively involved in creating and supporting the app-based labor market
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rather than allowing the market to be created by firms with monopsony
power and a significant bargaining advantage over workers. We suggest
that internet or app-based matching of workers with those seeing services
could be considered vital public infrastructure, and that these marketplaces
for gig services are natural monopolies like utilities. Governments could
regulate the app-based companies like private utilities are by a public
utilities commission, or governments could simply create and operate
their own app-based marketplace with an eye to the greater public good.
Wingham Rowan (BRIGGS; ROWAN, 2021) has been instrumental in
developing and promoting this type of approach.16
4. CONCLUSION

Those who control the gig economy and the new labor platforms
insist that this is a new era of freedom for workers to sell their labor to
multiple different purchasers, rather than being constrained through an
exclusive employment relationship. Indeed, many workers celebrate their
freedom of choice. Of course, this choice is often between working a number
of gigs or finding a fully satisfactory job in the traditional employment
economy. When that traditional economy stalls and unemployment rises, at
least some gig workers find that their freedom to choose quickly becomes
a necessary strategy to survive. They then find themselves working
outside the protections of employment law, including minimum wage and
basic benefits, in a struggle to make ends meet. We have described the
California experience of seeking to regulate this “freedom” in a manner that
preserves the dignity of workers without erasing the benefits of freedom
altogether. Regulatory balancing is an important goal. We cannot simply
assume that the “free” market will properly align the interests of workers,
hiring entities and society. As Janis Joplin hauntingly reminds us, all too
often freedom is just another word for nothing left to lose.
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